CC Testing Lab: Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
IPGARD Secure KVM Switch (Non-CAC Models) provide a secure medium to connect one or more input peripherals to one or more computers. The TOE models support connectivity between a single set of peripheral devices (keyboard/mouse, up to two displays depending on model, audio) and two or more connected computers.
The TOE consists of a family of devices that support different numbers of computers, different numbers of monitors, and different types of display protocols depending on model.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is hardware and firmware components of the IPGARD Secure KVM Switch (Non-CAC Models). The TOE model numbers, descriptions, and software/firmware versions are listed below:
Table 1: IPGARD 2-Port TOE models
| # | Model Name | Description | Eval. Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | SA-DPN-2S | 2-Port single-head Secure DP KVM w/audio | 4.00.001 |
| 2 | SA-DPN-2D | 2-Port dual-head Secure DP KVM w/audio | 4.00.001 |
| 3 | SA-DVN-2S | 2-Port single-head Secure DVI-I KVM w/audio | 4.00.010 |
| 4 | SA-DVN-2D | 2-Port dual-head Secure DVI-I KVM w/audio | 4.00.010 |
| 5 | SA-HDN-2S | 2-Port single-head Secure DP/HDMI KVM w/audio | 4.00.202 |
| 6 | SA-HDN-2D | 2-Port dual-head Secure DP/HDMI KVM w/audio | 4.00.202 |
Table 2: IPGARD 4-Port TOE models
| # | Model Name | Description | Eval. Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | SA-DPN-4S | 4-Port single-head Secure DP KVM w/audio | 4.00.001 |
| 2 | SA-DPN-4D | 4-Port dual-head Secure DP KVM w/audio | 4.00.001 |
| 3 | SA-DVN-4S | 4-Port single-head Secure DVI-I KVM w/audio | 4.00.010 |
| 4 | SA-DVN-4D | 4-Port dual-head Secure DVI-I KVM w/audio | 4.00.010 |
| 5 | SA-HDN-4S | 4-Port single-head Secure DP/HDMI KVM w/audio | 4.00.202 |
| 6 | SA-HDN-4D | 4-Port dual-head Secure DP/HDMI KVM w/audio | 4.00.202 |
Table 3: IPGARD 8 and 16-Port TOE models
| # | Model Name | Description | Eval. Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | SA-DPN-8S | 8-Port single-head Secure DP KVM w/audio | 4.00.001 |
| 2 | SA-DPN-8D | 8-Port dual-head Secure DP KVM w/audio | 4.00.001 |
| 3 | SA-DVN-8S | 8-Port single-head Secure DVI-I KVM w/audio | 4.00.010 |
| 4 | SA-DVN-8D | 8-Port dual-head Secure DVI-I KVM w/audio | 4.00.010 |
All TOE models are compatible with standard personal/portable computers, servers or thin-clients. Connected computers are assumed to run off-the-shelf general-purpose operating systems such as Windows or Linux. The TOE includes ports for the following interfaces:
Depending on TOE model, two or more of the following interfaces are supported:
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 5. These materials were supplemented with the requirements of the NIAP PP-Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Analog Audio Output Devices, Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices, version 1.0, all materials referenced therein, as well as any applicable supplemental guidance from NIAP, such as scheme policies, scheme publications, NIAP Technical Decisions, and official NIAP Technical Query responses. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the IPGard Secure KVM Administration and Security Management Tool Guide (Non-CAC), Version 1.1, February 11, 2021 and the respective User Manuals, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the IPGARD Secure KVM Switch Security Target (Non-CAC Models). The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed on July 9, 2021. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.
The TOE implements the User Data Protection and Data Isolation security function policies of the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device. This PP defines a peripheral sharing device as “a PSD is an IT product for connecting one or more peripheral devices to one or more computers such that data cannot flow between computers by way of the peripherals or the PSD. Examples of PSDs that can claim compliance to this PP include Keyboard, Video, Mouse (KVM) switches; Keyboard, Mouse (KM) switches; and Isolators.” The TOE includes KVM switches in its evaluation boundary.
The keyboard and mouse processor is programmed in firmware only to accept 108-key keyboard and 3-button mouse USB devices. Unauthorized peripheral devices will be rejected by the TOE’s keyboard and mouse ports. Wireless keyboard and mouse are special USB composite devices; when this type of device is recognized by the TOE, all front LED’s of the TOE will blink and the user will need to disconnect and reboot the TOE. The only USB host peripheral devices that are allowed by the TOE are keyboard and mouse host emulators. Basic USB 1.1/2.0 HID-class devices are authorized as valid endpoints by the TOE. Note that devices having integrated USB hub and composite devices will only be supported if the connected device has at least one endpoint which is a keyboard or mouse HID class. All other non-keyboard/mouse HID class endpoints will be disabled in this scenario. Both keyboard and mouse TOE ports are interchangeable. It is assumed based on the claimed PP that all standard peripheral devices are untrusted; therefore, the TOE protects the system from attacks that may be executed to exploit such devices and enable unauthorized data flows. By creating uni-directional isolated keyboard and mouse TOE channels that are tied to the two USB 1.1/2.0 ports on the TOE, unauthorized data flows are eliminated.
The TOE only supports AC/DC power, USB keyboard and mouse, user authentication devices, and video, which includes one or more of the following depending on TOE model:
All other peripheral types are rejected, either physically (because the TOE does not support the required physical interface) or logically (because the TOE does not recognize the connected peripheral as authorized).
The use of microphones as input devices is prohibited. All TOE devices support analog audio out switching and all TOE devices will prevent microphone devices. These microphones are stopped through the use of uni-directional audio diodes on both left and right stereo channels (forces data flow from only the computer to the connected audio device) and the LM4880 Boomer analog output amplifier which enforces uni-directional audio data flow. All audio signals are filtered in accordance with the Audio Filtration Specifications table defined in the PP-Module for Analog Audio Output.
Each connected computer has its own TOE isolated channel with its own Extended Display Identification Data (EDID) emulator and video input port. Data flows from the input video source through its respective EDID emulator and out of the monitor display port. Each video input interface is isolated from one another using different EDID ICs, power planes, ground planes, and electronic components in each independent channel. Depending on the specific TOE model, the following numbers and types of video inputs are supported:
Each TOE is equipped with an Administration and Security Management Tool that can be initiated by running an executable file on a computer with keyboard connected to the same computer via the TOE. The tool requires administrator or a user to be successfully identified and authenticated by the TOE in order to gain access to any supported feature. Some features are restricted to the Administrator role only, while other features can be performed by either the Administrator or User role.
User monitoring and control of the TOE is performed through the TOE front panel push buttons. These buttons are tied to the TOE system controller functionality. The TOE chassis has port selection LEDs that correspond to the push buttons. When a given computer is selected, its corresponding port selection LED is illuminated (the other channel LEDs remain off). During operation, all front panel LED indications cannot be turned off or dimmed by the user in any way, including after Restore Factory Default (reset).
All features of the TOE front panel are tested during power up self-testing. From power up until the termination of the TOE self-test, no channel is selected.
In order to mitigate potential tampering and replacement, the TOE is devised to ensure that any replacement may be detected, any physical modification is evident, and any logical modification may be prevented. The TOE is designed so that access to the TOE firmware, software, or its memory via its accessible ports is prevented. The TOE is designed to prevent any physical or logical access its internal memory. There is a mechanical switch on the inside of the TOE that triggers the anti-tampering state when the enclosure is manually opened. Once the anti-tampering state is triggered, the TOE is permanently disabled.
The TOE has a self-testing function that executes immediately after power is supplied including Restore Factory Default (reset) and power reset. Self-testing must complete successfully before normal operational access is granted to the TSF. The self-test function includes the following activities:
The TOE has a non-volatile memory event log which records all abnormal security events that occur within TOE operation. This log can be accessed by the identified and authorized administrator and dumped into a .txt file using a connected computer and the Administration and Security Management tool that is provided by the TOE vendor.